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Authenticity and Dogma: 
An Inextricable Connection in Heidegger’s Thought? 
 
ABSTRACT 
How can one be authentic, except with reference to some dogma?  An answer to this query is 
philosophically important in light of the significance that individuals attach to traditions of 
thought and practice and to epistemic commitments articulated in the context of the political, 
which are characterized as ideological appeals.  Here the thinking of Martin Heidegger is 
engaged as a way of evaluating the concept of dogma and the seemingly moral and political 
relevance of the concept of authenticity.  The point of the analysis is to conclude otherwise 
than is presupposed by the question, i.e., to conclude that one can be authentic without 
reference to some dogma.  
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The Question at Issue 
How can one be authentic, except with reference to some dogma? One who, in disposition of 
intellect if not in actual understanding, is critical of Heidegger’s thought (because of its 
implications for epistemological realism) may pose such a question. The concept in use is 
that of Eigentlichkeit, authenticity, and hence, concerns the related concept of authentic self 
(eigentlich Selbst).  The question is not to be dismissed outright as philosophically 
inconsequential.  The question, as framed, presupposes an inextricable connection between 
authenticity (as a mode of self-representation grounded in a concept of selfhood) and dogma 
(as a mode of belief having its consequent sociopolitical set of practices).  The implication is 
that one cannot be authentic except by being dogmatic in belief and practice.  A commitment 
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to authenticity, in short, presupposes an individual’s commitment to a ‘dogmatic mind.’1  But, 
is this presupposition correct?  This is the question engaged here. 
I argue against the legitimacy of the presupposition, accounting for (a) Heidegger’s 
remarks on authenticity and (b) a reasonably defensible account of dogma and concept of 
																																																								
1  I use the concept of ‘dogmatic mind’ initially as used by Tariq Ramadan, 
https://tariqramadan.com/english/the-dogmatic-mind-45/.  Ramadan writes: “The common feature of 
the various attitudes that gradually lead to monopolization of the path to the universal has less to do 
with the object of the quest than with the disposition of the intellect that goes on it. Points of view are 
determined by states of mind: all these attitudes have succumbed to the dogmatic temptation that 
colonizes the intellect. In that sense, the dogmatic mind is not necessarily a religious or a believer’s 
mind, and it is quite capable of influencing very rational intellects. The characteristic feature of the 
dogmatic mind is its tendency to see things from one exclusive angle, and to think in terms of 
absolutes: the dogmatic mind thinks that it is God and passes judgement from on high and in the name 
of eternity, just as it thinks that it is the absolute viewpoint (Bergson sees this as a contradiction in 
terms) and the only centre of what is seen and what there is to see. Exclusivity is its territory and its 
property, and the universal is its ideal: its truth alone is true, its reasons alone are rational, and only its 
doubts are certified.” 
 “The dogmatic mind displays, moreover, one further characteristic. It would be a mistake to 
think that it accepts the existence of only one point of view: the dogmatic mind is a binary mind. 
Whilst it states that its truth is the only truth, that its Way is exclusive and that its universal is the only 
universal, that is because it stipulates –at the same time—that anything that does not partake of that 
truth, that path and that universal is, at best, absolutely ‘other’ and, at worst, culpably mistaken. This 
simplistic state of mind can sometimes be astonishingly sophisticated; it is, to say the least, disturbing 
to observe, at the heart of postmodernity and globalization, the rise of mass movements that are, in 
varying degrees, intellectualized or emotive, that shape dogmatic and binary minds that are 
increasingly incapable of accepting the complex multiplicity of points of view, paths and ways.” 
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ideological appeal.  Thus, one may conclude that an individual can be authentic, and be so 
without reference to any dogma whatsoever.  Moreover, given Heidegger’s distinctions of 
authentic selfhood and inauthentic (uneigentlich) selfhood in relation to the anonymous “they” 
(das Man) that defers and displaces one’s own responsibility, authentic selfhood may be 
interpreted in a normative manner—despite the more or less prevalent understanding that 
Heidegger’s thought excludes any obviously “prescriptive” account of selfhood, such as one 
finds issued in moral philosophy (e.g., Kant’s personalitas moralis).2  Heidegger provides 
phenomenological clarification (description) only.3  But, in the juxtaposition of ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘inauthenticity’, one can argue that: Precisely because “Dasein finds itself and its world 
always already interpreted, and moreover finds its own interpretations conditioned by and 
permanently indebted to the anonymous social normativity governing intelligibility at large, a 
normativity Heidegger calls das Man Selbst [the “they-self”]”4, therefore an individual can 
alter his or her interpretation away from and in opposition to this anonymous (inauthentic) 
social normativity.  This is a move in the direction of a normativity that is properly his or her 
own, i.e., a movement or “modification” from inauthentic selfhood (uneigentlich Selbst) to 
one of authentic selfhood (eigentlich Selbst). 
																																																								
2 See, e.g., P. Kleingeld, Marcus Willaschek, ‘Autonomy Without Paradox: Kant, Self-Legislation and 
the Moral Law’, Philosophers’ Imprint 19(6) (2019), 1-18. 
3 Heidegger’s thought has been interpreted to be consistent with either an amoral or even an immoral 
perspective on life.  See, e.g., C. Guignon, ‘Authenticity, moral values, and psychotherapy’, in C. 
Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp. 215-239.  See also the first section of essays on authenticity in M. A. Wrathall, Jeff Malpas, 
(ed.), Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000). 
4 Carman, ‘Must We Be Inauthentic?’ p. 20. 
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Individuals attach significance to traditions of thought and practice, also to epistemic 
commitments that are contextually political. These are sometimes characterized, pejoratively, 
as “ideological appeals,” often articulated in political and religious contexts of collectively 
defined association and identity. ‘Dogma’ often denotes a collective mode of identity and 
commitment, often made uncritically and thus without ongoing interrogation of the 
foundation of beliefs.5  Steven J. Bartlett commented about ‘ideology’ in the sense intended 
here, thus: 
By the term ‘ideology’, we usually mean something like ‘a distorted, if only because unilateral and 
partial, view of reality which comes to supersede and to substitute for the real world.’ From a 
psychological viewpoint, it is essentially an obsessive delusion, because it reifies a system of beliefs, 
conferring on these a significance which closes the mind of the believer to realities not admitted by the 
belief-system. Philosophically speaking, allegiance to an ideology amounts to subscription to a 
solipsistic creed. It is an orientation which Marx therefore judged to be essentially alienating, since in 
an ideology, a man mistakes his own mentations for reality. He becomes hermetically sealed in his own 
system of constructs.6  
Similarly, in his interpretation of the meaning of the twentieth century, Kenneth Boulding 
engaged the concept of ideology in relation to history and civilization.  Ideology is “an image 
																																																								
5 See, e.g., A.C. MacIntyre,  Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy 
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1978); L. Althusser, On Ideology (London: Verso, 2008); I. Adams, 
The Logic of Political Belief: A Philosophical Analysis of Ideology (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1989); J.G. Finlayson, ‘The Theory of Ideology and the Ideology of Theory: Habermas contra 
Adorno’, Historical Materialism 11(2) (2003), pp. 165-187; T. Kleven, ‘Ideology as Moral Discourse 
or Struggle for Power’, Social Philosophy Today 8 (1993), pp. 37-50.  See here also, D.E. Ingersoll, 
R.K. Matthews, A. Davison, The Philosophical Roots of Modern Ideology (New York: Sloan 
Publishing, 2016). 
6 Bartlett, ‘Philosophy as Ideology,’ p. 5. 
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of the world [having] power over a man’s mind and that leads him to build his personal 
identity around it”—thus, a “world-image” inclusive of “a value-system capable of 
developing principles of moral action and a standard for criticism of behavior.”7 
These characterizations of ideology relate to dogma qua self-alienation.  That 
includes alienation from one’s potentiality to be (die Möglichkeit). This potentiality depends 
on “self-discovery” (Selbstbefindlichkeit), particularly on the ontological understanding that, 
a human being “is either authentically or inauthentically disclosed to itself as regards its 
existence.”8 The latter fact relates to the governance of dogma in the “public” domain 
(understood here in the sense of a dominium that commands one’s word, thought, and deed 
according to some systematic engagement and sense of collective identity).  This is central to 
any clarification of the possibility of authenticity.9  The latter concept is understood in the 
sense of the “distinctive potentiality-for-being” that is an issue for the individual, in 
Heidegger’s sense “most one’s own” (eigentlich), therefore a matter of “self-appropriation” 
and self-expression.  Hence: One’s authenticity is a potentiality for being that is discovered, 
appropriated, and expressed in and for a sustainable authentic selfhood. 
Heidegger scholars are agreed generally that Heidegger’s distinction of authentic self 
and inauthentic self does not intend a normative preference for the former over the latter.  
Such concepts are not normally to be interpreted as part of a normative “ethics.” Thus one 
																																																								
7 Boulding, The Meaning of the Twentieth Century, pp. 161-162. 
 
8 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H.325. 
 
9 Bartlett’s comments on philosophy as ideology (see Note 2 above, at p. 5) resonate with the basic 
point: “In its social and political application, the term [ideology] normally now refers to the 
embodiment in social institutions of an exclusionary set of beliefs.  Understood in this way, an 
ideology represents the dominant institutionalized social/political paradigm.  The beliefs which 
comprise the ideology provide rationalizations for the policy decisions made by those in power.” 
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would not advance a moral judgment that “one should be authentic” or that “one should not 
be inauthentic.”  Rather, through these concepts Heidegger presents a phenomenological 
description of human “modes of being.” What is descriptive is therefore first and foremost a 
matter of methodological commitment, not a prescription per se.10  However, Heidegger is 
clear that every individual is faced with a basic “existentiell” (existenziell) possibility of 
authentic or inauthentic existence, faced with it as an issue, as something yet in question, a 
matter of one’s “mode” of being yet indeterminate but to be determined through the primary 
act of self-disclosure.11 
This determination is a matter of “decision” (Entscheidenheit).  The future is an 
ekstasis of human temporality, according to which one “stands out” into one’s indeterminate 
future. It is a faulty interpretation to construe an individual’s existentiell possibility according 
to the metaphysics of presence, i.e., limiting one’s being to what is merely present at hand.  
Potentiality of being remains at the center of ontological concern, of individual concrete 
historicity. This existentiell possibility is “yet to be determined,” hence the distinction is not 
idle.  It has both moral and political efficacy, (1) relative to an individual’s being-with other 
humans (Mitdasein) and (2) relative to an individual’s engagement of all other beings 
																																																								
10 Heidegger does not commit to a Husserlian method of phenomenological clarification; “description” 
is never to be taken as complete or systematically apodictic in what is given as an approximation to 
the “essence” of a phenomenon.  This point is emphasized in Heidegger’s understanding of the 
simultaneous concealment (Verborgenheit) and unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) of Being (Sein). 
11 In Being and Time, ‘ontic-existentiell’ (ontisch-existenziell) is used to characterize the concrete 
ways in which humans engage their life world and lived experience.  Heidegger distinguishes this 
concrete situation of human existence from the ontological structures he describes 
phenomenologically, the latter described as “existential” (existenzial). 
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(Mitsein) in the life-world (Lebenswelt).  Both engagements presuppose an individual’s 
concrete historicity, and an attitude of care (Sorge) and solicitude (Fürsorge). 
Heidegger’s clarification of das Man presents the they-self in the setting of everyday 
life, in all its negativity (fallenness, anonymity, ambiguity, curiosity, idle chatter, 
everydayness, etc.).  This seemingly makes the issue of authenticity a reasonably normative 
quest: Understood as a call to an individual’s determination of his/her potentiality-for-being, 
authenticity is to be taken as an essential feature of an individual’s properly appropriated 
ethical being. Heidegger himself asked: “Is it not the case that underlying our interpretation 
of the authenticity and totality of Dasein, there is an ontical way of taking existence which 
may be possible but need not be binding for everyone?”12  
The implication is positive:  Individuated Dasein can—one asserts here, should—
undertake an existentiell modification of its everyday understanding of self.  This it can and 
should do as a matter of “care for oneself” (Selbstsorge)—an appropriation of “care” (Sorge) 
that is at the same time care for others (solicitude, Fürsorge).13 Heidegger allows for an 
individual existentiell modification that is not “binding for everyone.” He is not speaking of 
an obligation that is universal, in the way a perfect duty (following Kant here) “binds” an 
individual to morally necessary conduct, thus to form the individual as personalitas moralis 
on the basis of that practical rationality.  Rather, Heidegger says, “Dasein can be 
authentically itself only if it makes this possible for itself of its own accord.”14 Thus, 
authentic existence is not, in its concrete manifestation, a praxis governed by a universalist 
ethic, even though that seems not to be prima facie excluded from an individual’s 
																																																								
12 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H.313, italics added. 
 
13 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H.318. 
 
14 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H.308, italics added. 
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possibilities, given that every individual has a “fateful destiny…in and with its 
‘generation’”.15  
Since the point here is authentic individuation, the existential analysis cannot discuss 
(either as a matter of description or prescription) ahead of time “what Dasein factically 
resolves in any particular case.”  Authentic individuation is not a matter of the “public” 
(öffentlich) over-determination of one’s ontical (concrete) way of choosing. The choice is 
between (1) the inauthenticity that characterizes the everyday surrender to das Man and (2) 
the potentiality that includes authentic selfhood in opposition to the standards of the everyday.  
One speaks here of choice, a free decision, and thus a resolution of what is at issue for an 
individual. An existential analysis such as Heidegger carries out “excludes even the 
existential projection of the factical possibilities of existence.”16 But, while existential 
																																																								
15 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H.436. I do not agree with Vogel in his claim that Heidegger “makes 
himself vulnerable to the charges that his philosophy is radically individualistic, egocentric, 
voluntaristic, and decisionistic.”  See Lawrence Vogel, The Fragile "We": Ethical Implications of 
Heidegger's Being and Time (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994), p. 38.  Vogel argues 
that the mere fact of possibilities to be chosen “provides no criterion for choice among possibilities;” 
but it does not follow therefore that authenticity “collapses into irrational decision.” (Vogel, p. 60)  
Against this conclusion Hubert Dreyfus would have us reasonably relate Heidegger’s resolute Dasein 
to Aristotle’s phronimos.  Dreyfus reminds: “…according to Aristotle, since there are no rules [in the 
sense of rules and standards that are ‘intrinsically’ authoritative] that dictate that what the phronimos 
does is the correct thing to do in that type of situation, the phronimos, like any expert, cannot explain 
why he did what he did.”  Heidegger, of course, agrees: “The Situation cannot be calculated in 
advance or presented like something occurent, which has not been determined beforehand but is open 
to the possibility of such determination.”’  Even so, the decision taken by a phronimos is not irrational 
but consistent with the ethical propriety of the relative mean (hence, virtue) in the given “Situation.” 
16 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H.383. 
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analysis cannot project individual factical possibilities, nevertheless each individual Dasein 
may resolve to disclose these possibilities for her/himself such as only s/he can do insofar as 
they are his or her own.  Heidegger says: 
Proximally and for the most part the Self is lost in the “they.”  It understands itself in terms of those 
possibilities of existence which “circulate” in the “average” public way of interpreting Dasein today.  
These possibilities have been made unrecognizable by ambiguity; yet they are well known to us.  The 
authentic existentiell understanding is so far from extricating itself from the way of interpreting Dasein 
which has come down to us, that in each case it is in terms of this interpretation, against it, and yet 
again for it, that any possibility one has chosen is seized upon in its resolution.17  
Clearly, one can choose according to the concrete interpretations of existence of the 
anonymous they or one can choose against it. What matters is an individual’s “constancy of 
the Self [Ständigkeit des Selbst], in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness 
[beständigen Standfestigkeit],” which Heidegger says is “the authentic counter-possibility 
[eigentliche Gegenmöglichkeit] to the non-Self constancy which is characteristic of irresolute 
falling.”18  The latter is evident in the anonymous existence characteristic of an individual’s 
identification with the self-understanding issued by das Man. What is disclosed to an 
individual as his/her possibility of self-constancy, thus of authentic existence [eigentlichen 
Existenz], need not, therefore (as already noted) be binding on everyone.  Notwithstanding, if 
one is to be open to the ongoing unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) of beings (Seienden), 
including the unconcealment of an individual’s own most proper (eigentlich) potentiality for 
being, then any individual commitment to dogma (including here any deformation of moral 
universalism that presents itself as the politics of totalitarianism) seems wholly problematic 
in relation to an individual’s quest for authentic existence.  In fact, following Hannah Arendt 
																																																																																																																																																																												
 
17 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H.383. 
 
18 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H.322. 
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(1958: 329), one posits that the politics of totalitarianism qua dogmatic appropriation of the 
universal counts as the most totalizing form of surrender to the dictates of das Man.19 
Accordingly, to evaluate the basic question posed at the outset, I review in brief what 
Heidegger has to say about “fundamental metaphysical positions.” Then, in this context, I 
consider the meaning of ‘dogma’.  Thereafter, a clarification of Heidegger’s position on 
authenticity allows us to reject the presupposition that one can be authentic only with 
reference to some dogma. 
Heidegger on Wesensgestalt (“Essential Formation”) 
Heidegger clarifies that human existence is always at issue: “As long as Dasein is, 
there is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can and will be.”20  This 
statement leaves the future for a human being always indeterminate and unsettled, consequent 
to the relation of concealment (Verborgenheit) to unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) of Being 
(Sein).  This process governs human endeavors in the ongoing disclosure of being through 
and for what humans experience as their life-world (Lebenswelt).  Disclosure of being both 
presupposes and entails understanding and interpretation of being (Seinsverständnis).  
																																																								
19 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 329. Arendt (p. 239) wrote, e.g., of the captivity of an 
individual to anonymous processes: “No matter what individual qualities or defects a man may have, 
once he has entered the maelstrom of an unending process of expansion, he will, as it were, cease to 
be what he was and obey the laws of the process, identify himself with anonymous forces that he is 
supposed to serve in order to keep the whole process in motion…” Further, in contrast to the 
significance Heidegger attaches to being-towards-death as one’s uttermost possibility of being, the 
totalitarianism of the Nazi death camps made death itself anonymous, as Arendt put it (p. 485): “In a 
sense they took away the individual’s own death, proving that henceforth nothing belonged to him 
and he belonged to no one.” 
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. H.233-234. 
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Understanding and interpretation are fallible and indeterminate claims about reality.  This 
movement away from determinate claims thereby concedes human finitude in the 
epistemological quest for certitude about human affairs.  This is why the concept of “world” 
(Welt) is first of all presented in the sense of a “referential context of signification,” i.e., what 
Heidegger calls “significance” (Bedeutsamkeit):  “The ‘wherein’ of an act of understanding 
which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of 
Being that belongs to involvements: and this ‘wherein’ is the phenomenon of world.”21  
Human self-understanding presupposes an understanding of world in the foregoing 
sense.  In Heidegger’s analysis, we encounter entities “(with)in the world” in the threefold 
sense of entities “present-at-hand” (Vorhandensein) such as beings of nature, entities “ready-
to-hand” (Zuhandensein) such as those of equipment or artifice, and those who, like ourselves, 
are other Daseienden who have a history and without whom there can be no disclosure of 
world (in the proper sense of that term): Dasein is the topos, the historical site, for the 
disclosure of Being. 
But, it is most important in the clarification of the topos of Being that there can be no 
disclosure of world without Dasein’s projection upon possibilities of being (reading in ‘being’ 
here the infinitive ‘to be’, thus an individual’s possibilities ‘to be’): “A can-be, a possibility 
as possibility, is there only in projection, in projecting oneself upon that can-be,” says 
Heidegger.22  It is through such projections, as individuated possibilities of existence, that 
one gives determination to human existence. Thereby, one may resolve upon an authentic 
existence, to the extent one chooses to overcome the unwitting surrender to the average, the 
everyday, the ambiguous, and all that characterizes anonymity of the public (all of which is 
fallenness into inauthentic existence).  Authentic existence is not, therefore, to be construed 
																																																								
21 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H.86. 
 
22 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 277. 
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in the sense of some final settlement or final resolution upon a fully determinate self-
discovery. But, this is nonetheless to be understood in the sense of a temporal actualization or 
facticity that can and does have its historical representation, i.e., in the way an individual’s 
word, thought, and deed are inter-related historically in and with his or her generation. 
Projection can be an authentic mode of human action, since the pursuit of possibility 
involves choices about the future.  When these choices follow from sustained self-discovery 
and self-understanding, then the resolution is in the direction of authenticity that 
deliberatively leaves the dominion of das Man behind.  Such choices about possibilities of 
human existence presuppose a mode of thinking that allows for what Heidegger calls “world 
occurrence”—“…not only in the sense that something is happening within the world which 
has significance for the world, but also in the sense in which and through which the world 
itself arises anew in its actual origins and rules as world.”  On this basis Heidegger considers 
some individuals to have choices that are so fundamental to the determination of the world as 
to allow for these determinations of existence to be characterized as “world-historical.”  
There are, in short, “world-historical” individuals. They disclose a new historical 
configuration that governs “for a time,” i.e., for an “epoch,” thus for what the later Heidegger 
denominates an “epochal” disclosure within the history of Being (Seinsgeschichte).  Each 
such history is related to a conceptual framework that installs a determinate metaphysical 
order, such as is articulated in the history of Western metaphysics. 
One must be careful here, however, about how one conceives “world occurrence.”  
What matters to human existence in the projection of possibilities of being is the grounding 
freedom through which the world itself—i.e., the totality of the “referential context of 
signification”—arises anew.  If the world itself is to arise anew indeed, then it must do so in 
tension with the dominant metaphysical position of an age, what Heidegger calls a 
“fundamental metaphysical position.”  This includes: (a) a conception of the selfhood of man; 
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(b) a conception of being; (c) a conception of the essence of truth; and (d) a conception of the 
manner of standard-giving, i.e., the manner in which standards of understanding and 
judgment (ontological, theological, epistemological, political, moral, aesthetic) are given in 
and for an historical epoch.  Such positions change historically, of course, despite any 
internally coherent claims to infallibility and certitude as they relate to human experience and 
to what is accepted as a referential context of signification.  If one construes such a position 
to be an incorruptible installation of “the” necessarily “true” understanding of being (Sein), 
thus consistent with a given standard of “truth,” then one forecloses prematurely the 
possibilities of the future, both for oneself (as Dasein) and for others (as Mitdasein).  This, 
then, is dogma in the most fundamental sense of the word, i.e., it is “metaphysical” dogma.  
All socio-politically interpreted conceptions of dogma and ideological appeal have their 
ground in one or another such metaphysical dogma. 
The change of fundamental metaphysical positions is clear from the history of 
Western philosophy itself: e.g., when one considers “the quarrel between the ancients and the 
moderns” about any number of basic questions involving human existence, including, the 
movement in thought from the Platonic or neo-Platonist and Aristotelian philosophies 
subsequently incorporated into medieval conceptions about the “order of creation” (e.g., as 
clarified by Augustine and Aquinas) to the modern “order of reason” (e.g., as clarified by 
Descartes and Spinoza), onward to the metaphysical and moral nihilism of late modernity 
(e.g., as represented by Nietzsche) and whatever we may denominate the contemporary post-
modern order to be (for Heidegger, e.g., “the Age of Technology”).  Each metaphysical 
position constitutes an “essential formation” (Wesensgestalt) of the world into which 
individuals are immersed willy-nilly.  Each formation provides (more or less tacitly) the basis 
of individual and collective self-understanding and a corresponding individual and collective 
praxis.  Each metaphysical position resonates historically throughout each subsequent 
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position, if only implicitly governing “the everyday” of human existence by way of the given 
standards that are expressed in word, thought, and deed. 
Indeed, for European humanity the twentieth century has unfolded under the influence 
of Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical position, in its own way yet metaphysical, as Heidegger 
observed: “The denial of an eternal God or Being entails the destruction of all fixed and 
immutable standards of good and evil or noble and base and, hence, the destruction of the 
basis for either a universal moral law or natural standards of excellence.  In this light, all 
standards are revealed as historically relative, as mere prejudices or ideologies serving to 
maintain the explicit power of some groups, race, caste or class.”23  Such would be the case 
with the philosophy of Nietzsche, the political thought of Marx, the psychology of Freud, and 
the subsequent “death of God” theology articulated in the post-WW2 era.  To accept any such 
formation as legitimately governing in perpetuity—including the metaphysical and moral 
nihilism represented by Nietzsche and adopted into multifarious forms of post-Christian 
moral philosophy—is to foreclose possibilities of individuated being that issue consequent to 
the ontological ground of human freedom. This foreclosure assures the continued dominium 
of the inauthentic modes of living installed by das Man—a structure of Wesensgestalt not to 
be accepted. 
This ground of human freedom, as the primordial origin of the human way to be, is at 
once archē-tectonic (standard-setting) and alētheia-ological (truth-disclosing).  Hence, there 
could be no world-historical determinations of humanity providing a frame of reference for 
individual self-understanding in the absence of this ground.  But, human facticity has always 
been such that the various metaphysical-historical determinations of humanity are neither 
inevitable nor unalterable in the case of the possibilities of individuated Dasein, despite the 
fact such fundamental positions govern epochally.  To say they govern epochally is to say 
																																																								
23 Gillespie, ‘Martin Heidegger,’ p. 889. 
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that they unfold for their time and generally govern self-understanding, consistent with the 
disclosure of beings that is part of every Wesengestalt installing a “world-view” 
(Weltanschauung). 
What matters, then, is the overcoming (Überwindung) of a given metaphysical 
position in and for future possibilities of human existence, ‘existence’ to be understood in 
Heidegger’s sense that presupposes both human historicity (concretely) and temporality (as 
ontological structure).24  Human Dasein is ek-sistent, Heidegger says, every human being 
living by way of disclosing his or her world, opening it up to new possibilities of thought, 
word, and deed, appropriated either authentically or inauthentically.  Both modes of self-
representation carry their mode of understanding.  But, as Hubert Dreyfus remarked, 
authentic existence depends on an intelligibility that is better than the average intelligibility 
of inauthentic existence.25  To introduce the valuation of “better than,” as Dreyfus does, is to 
assert a normative value to authentic selfhood as a preferred counter-possibility to 
inauthentic selfhood.  Human existentiality unavoidably requires that one project one’s self 
toward ends—not in the Aristotelian sense of a telos that relates functionally (i.e., 
determinately) to a causal archē (as would be the case with what Heidegger denominates 
“things present-at-hand”), thus not determined in advance by an archē-teleo-logical calculus 
																																																								
24 See Chapter 4, ‘Overcoming Metaphysics’, in R. Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical 
Reader (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), pp. 67-90. 
25 See Dreyfus, ‘Can there be a better source of meaning than everyday practices?’ who writes (p. 1) 
concerning his exposition of Division I of Being and Time, that “the average intelligibility described 
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according to the “essence” (Wesen, in the metaphysical sense of essentia related to existentia) 
of an entity; but in the sense of an open possibility (Möglichkeit).  Of course, this 
existentiality (conceived here “futurally,” rather than in terms of the metaphysics of presence) 
is always in tension with human facticity, the latter “proximally and for the most part” 
preoccupied with the present and absorbed in the things about us (our “environing” world).  
Heidegger clarified this in Being and Time thus: 
[Not only is Dasein] inclined to fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself 
in terms of that world by its reflected light, but also…Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the tradition 
of which it has more or less explicitly taken hold. This tradition keeps it from providing its own 
guidance, whether in inquiring or in choosing…When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such 
a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather 
becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it 
blocks our access to those primordial ‘sources’ from which the categories and concepts handed down 
to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed, it makes us forget that they have had such an 
origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we 
need not even understand.26  
Problematic here is the captivity of the individual to the authority of tradition. Problematic is 
a lack of explicit consciousness about one’s historical “essence,” i.e., how a type of thinking 
determines an age in the basic concepts that govern and which have their corollary practices 
installed.  Against the governance of tradition, in pursuit of the sources that permit a self-
interrogation, Heidegger would have us undertake an “essential thinking” (wesentliches 
Denken), a mode of thinking that is “untimely,” always and necessarily. This is to say that 
there is no law that demands that an individual’s thinking follow his or her time, that s/he 
succumb to the governance of tradition as if it were a tradition not to be interrogated. Hence, 
essential thinking enables one to “overcome” the governance of the given (presumptive) 
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standards—ontological, epistemological, theological, alētheiological, political, moral, 
aesthetic.  Heidegger hence posits the possibility of essential thinking for an individual so 
that s/he may seek his or her own guidance in the direction of his or her own potentiality for 
being even against the authority of tradition.  It is through the posit of a counter-possibility 
that the individual may seek to clarify what remains concealed, viz., the sources in the 
process of the transmission and appropriation of a given fundamental metaphysical position.  
Every tradition has its origin.  The sources of tradition are ever subject to interrogation.  This 
is done through the very act of essential thinking, transcending thereby the historical 
limitations of a fundamental metaphysical position.  Such thinking moves in the direction of 
the new, the “unsaid,” that may yet find its way into unconcealment. 
Heidegger on Authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) 
 Heidegger’s clarification of essential thinking is positioned in relation to historicism 
and actualism as modes of thinking and contexts for self-understanding. Proponents of both 
“calculate” (thus, “calculative thinking,” rechnendes Denken) what is seemingly necessary 
for the present, on the basis of the past, privileging the presumed authority of tradition.  
Essential thinking (also denominated “meditative thinking,” besinnliches Denken) emerges in 
intellectual strife (Streit) with both historicism and actualism.   One who is attuned to “the 
historical essence” of an age, to what is transmitted as a given fundamental metaphysical 
position, understands the appeal of essential thinking as decisive thinking:  the decision to 
avoid, thereby not to enable, the ‘configuration’ of an inauthentic future: “the future must 
first win itself, not from a Present, but from the inauthentic future,”27 i.e., from the future that 
is merely the installation of tradition and its continuing governance over all that is given as 
“the present.”  It is problematic that, on the one hand, “Factically, Dasein is constantly ahead 
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of itself”—attuned to the claim of the future—but also, on the other hand,  “inconstantly 
anticipatory with regard to its existentiell possibility,”28 i.e., to the need for individuated 
Dasein to unconceal an authentic self that is to be won against the presumed authority of 
tradition and the publicness of das Man that deficiently settles upon the claim of 
everydayness, and which thereby sustains inauthentic selfhood. 
This is an important distinction: 
(1) One can be immersed in possibilities of being that represent an inauthentic future, 
possibilities that one merely “awaits” (“The inauthentic future has the character of 
awaiting [des Gewärtigens]”); or, 
(2) Pitting oneself against both historicism and actualism with their installation of the 
presumed authority of tradition, one can project possibilities of being (in an entirely 
novel configuration of word, thought, and deed) that disclose “counter-possibilities” 
to those handed down by tradition, thus appropriating the claim of an authentic future 
that is avowedly and resolutely one’s own. 
The projected possibilities in the second case belong to a future one anticipates rather than 
merely awaits.  The individual human Dasein is thus exposed to what amounts to a 
fundamental liability—in the sense of the foundation of (a) individual responsibility to 
oneself in the sense of care (Sorge) for oneself, (b) accountability for the care for others like 
oneself, and (c) solicitude for the life-world.  Each of these has normative appeal as essential 
thinking is pitted deliberately against calculative thinking in the interest of the concrete 
possibilities that are situationally “one’s own” as one’s own anticipated authentic future.  
Heidegger puts it this way: 
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Only because Dasein can expressly choose itself on the basis of its selfhood can it be committed to 
others.  And only because, in being towards itself as such, Dasein can understand anything like a “self” 
can it furthermore attend at all to a thou-self.  Only because Dasein, constituted by the for-the-sake-of, 
exists in selfhood, only for this reason is anything like human community possible.29 
Thus, every individual lives at any given moment either by awaiting or by anticipating his or 
her own possibilities of existence, including the possibility of an authentic existence that 
depends on an anticipatory disclosure. 30  This anticipatory disclosure depends on 
“understanding oneself in that potentiality-for-Being which reveals itself in projection.”31 It is 
only through this anticipatory act that the individual decidedly [one must think here 
Heidegger’s understanding of decision, Entscheidung] wrenches himself away from “average” 
and “ambiguous” meanings of human existence, these having been installed by das Man in 
the interest of a collective identity.  “Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as 
concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self.”32  
This concern (Sorge) and solicitude (Fürsorge) depend on the individual’s “state of 
mind” (to be understood here not psychologically, but in Heidegger’s sense of an existential 
structure), i.e., “anxiety” [Angst].  Heidegger here points to the anticipatory disclosure that 
belongs to death as an individual’s uttermost possibility.  This disclosure must overcome 
“cowardly fear” so as to appropriate an “impassioned freedom towards death.”33 This, then, is 
a matter of the most fundamental sense of the courage to be, linking to the Aristotelian “man 
of practical wisdom” (phronimos, as Dreyfus understands it), who resolves on a decision (1) 
																																																								
29 Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 190. 
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relative to himself (2) in a given situation.  However, “The fact that an authentic potentiality-
for-Being-a-whole is ontologically possible for Dasein, signifies nothing, so long as a 
corresponding ontical potentiality-for-Being has not been demonstrated in Dasein itself.”34 
Heidegger clearly links the sense of existential structure to the concrete existentiell matter of 
an individual living consistent with his or her resolute choices.  This is a matter of practical 
wisdom, phronēsis, rather than an a priori apodictically given imperative of action.  
Heidegger thus allows for an individual (Dasein) to attest to “a possible authenticity of its 
existence, so that [s/he] not only makes known that in an existentiell manner such 
authenticity is possible, but demands this of [him/herself].” 35  This “demand” is an 
ontologically grounded imperative of action. Its authority is given in the ek-stasis of the 
authentic future, pitted over and against the governance of the (inauthentic) present (e.g., in 
the insistence upon collective identity) or the past (e.g., in the presumed authority of 
tradition). 
With this one statement Heidegger articulates what may move one in thought, word, 
and deed to a “normative” sense of being.  To demand authenticity of oneself is to seek it 
actively, i.e., resolutely, as a self-given imperative of action.   This entails an existential 
modification of one’s being “lost” (one’s being governed, more or less tacitly, in the tasks, 
rules, standards, concerns, possibilities, etc., that define one who is surrendered to das 
Man).36  This surrender is the evidence of one’s being lost in inauthenticity, such that this 
inauthentic mode of existence determines an individual’s “destiny” (Geschick), the very 
concept denoting the absence of individually determined resoluteness.37 “When Dasein thus 
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brings itself back from the ‘they,’ the they-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it 
becomes authentic Being-one’s-Self…In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes 
possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-for-Being.”38 Heidegger characterizes a 
task that belongs to the individual alone, which s/he must undertake alone, as a singularly 
individual act of responsibility and accountability, i.e., as a fundamental liability of selfhood. 
In short, as George Schrader put it in commenting on the relation of responsibility and 
existence in Heidegger’s thought, every human Dasein “is burdened with the ontological 
necessity of responding to himself in the sense of having to answer for himself for what he is 
and does.  The first as well as the last problem man encounters is his own existence.  To be is 
not simply to be liable; it is the original human liability.”39 One can modify Schrader’s claim 
by linking it to Heidegger’s conceptual distinction of authentic future and inauthentic future, 
thus to say: The original human liability is given in the individual Dasein’s projection of 
possibilities unconcealing the authentic future that must be won against the inauthentic 
future.  Phenomenologically speaking, Heidegger would say, the authentic future (in the 
sense of ‘the real’) must be won in a process of unconcealment of being.  An individual’s 
choice is directed at an earnest disclosure of “the real” against the tendency of the everyday 
to assure the dominance of both “appearance” and “semblance,” especially—as Norman K. 
Swazo (1986) put it relating Heidegger’s thought on appearance and semblance to Socrates’s 
complaint about everyday politics in Plato’s Republic—in the domain of politics where 
ideology can and does govern unwittingly. 
 All depends on an individual’s pursuit of an authentic self won and sustained in 
fundamental strife (Riss) against the installed authority of the anonymous they-self (das Man-
selbst).  Where there is anonymity, as in the case of appeal to the authority of das Man 
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(represented all too often in ostensibly defensible appeals to the authority of tradition), “no 
one in particular is responsible.” In this way tradition governs to install a collective identity, 
diminishing possibilities of authentic selfhood. Yet, one who recognizes his or her original 
liability appropriates an ontological responsibility always first and foremost “one’s own,” 
thus Heidegger’s choice of ‘eigentlich’, according to which authentic Dasein affirms its own 
essential being despite the imposition of collective identity. 
 Authentic Dasein projects upon possibilities of being without calculating precisely 
how such possibility becomes actualized in the present, i.e., in the sense that all that matters 
is the actualization as actuality.  This is because human facticity (as Dasein) is different from 
the factuality of entities present-at-hand.  Simply, “Existent Dasein [i.e., when properly 
understood] does not encounter itself as something present-at-hand within-the-world” in the 
way in which one does objects of nature.40  Interpreting Heidegger, Werner Marx says, “This 
kind of possibility, which is not thought from the actualizing actuality, is an ‘existential’ 
which is fundamentally ‘open’ and can be transmuted into a new ‘power of possibility.’”41 
One who holds open the possibilities of authentic being relinquishes attachment to the false 
security of das Man.  The task is to listen to one’s own most proper call of conscience that 
demands a hearing, against the voice of das Man that is disclosed as “public conscience” and 
thus as “a dubious fabrication.”42 The individual is expected to assess the “Situation” that is 
itself “open” to ongoing self-disclosure in the service of self-discovery. 
Only in relinquishing this attachment to das Man does an individual transmute a 
possibility of being into a new power of ek-sistence, viz., transcending one’s historical time 
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and place by heeding the claim of the authentic future.  This call of conscience manifests an 
ontological liability calling forth a normative judgment in a given situation.  With the latter 
one experiences “an existentiell modification of the ‘they’ [das Man],” reversing one’s 
“lostness” that is sustained by appeal to the false security of the anonymous public.  This 
transmutation of possibility is grounded in freedom, which is always the source of obligation 
and opportunity.43 With this transmutation, the claim of authentic selfhood “denies the they-
self its dominion.”44  That is not an idle choice: It is (as a matter of phronēsis) a normative 
judgment in favor of one’s authentic mode of being. 
 When this transmutation occurs, then “Everyday familiarity collapses.  Dasein has 
been individualized,” such that the idle talk (Gerede) of the anonymous they loses its hold on 
the present and authentic possibilities of self-discovery are opened up.  Idle talk yields to 
discourse (Rede) in the obligation that interrogates origins rather than merely appropriating 
the authority of transmitted tradition.  Resolutely individuated Dasein in this way overcomes 
appeals to historicism, actualism, and the authority of tradition.  Moreover, “When the call 
[of conscience] gives us a potentiality-for-Being to understand it does not give us one which 
is ideal and universal; it discloses it as that which has been currently individualized and 
which belongs to that particular Dasein.”45 Hence, this ownmost authenticity by no means 
stipulates a universal rule and, so, neither presupposes nor endorses a normative theory that 
prescribes universally obligatory conduct (in Kant’s sense).  Instead, what is normative here 
is similar to Aristotle’s stipulation of an individual commitment to moral judgment in view of 
a “relative” mean, thus what follows as the phronēsis of the phronimos (following Dreyfus 
here). 
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 That said, however, one must be cautioned: Resolute individuation into authentic 
selfhood does not settle on something like individual autonomy championed, e.g., by either 
Kantian or Lockean moral philosophy, if neither universal necessity nor universal assent 
characterizes the resolute decision belonging to authentic selfhood.  Instead, as Reinhart 
Maurer put it, “the realm of human action is established autonomously as the compromise 
relationship of many individual autonomies.”46 And, Maurer continues, 
Autonomy dissolves itself in an absolute freedom which has nothing on which to stand and on which to 
rely except each man’s claim to freedom.  Therefore, the political and the ethical appear together as the 
problem of discovering and establishing a system which will do justice to this claim. 
How does one do justice to this claim to freedom, if it is not limited merely to the 
compromise relationship of autonomous individuals sharing in a collective life, especially the 
type that insists on adherence to a collective identity?  The sort of response to the call of 
conscience that Heidegger describes phenomenologically is not that of a moral calculus 
according to which one’s “guilt” is interpreted by way of “the domain of concern in the sense 
of reckoning up claims and balancing them off.”47 Heidegger refuses calculative thinking.  
Rather, Heidegger continues: “The idea of guilt must not only be raised above the domain of 
that concern in which we reckon things up, but it must also be detached from relationship to 
any law or ‘ought’ such that by failing to comply with it one loads himself with guilt.”48 This 
places the individual in a situation that (as Heidegger would say) makes the law mere caprice.  
A phronetic response in a given situation allows the individual to respond to the call of 
conscience and make a resolute choice at once moral and political. 
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One cannot eliminate the significance of a political association (or, as Heidegger says, 
the polis) as “the place, the there, wherein and as which historical being-there is,” or, “the 
historical place, the there in which, out of which, and for which history happens.”49 It is in the 
historical setting of the polis (in this essential sense of place, topos), in the historical setting 
of the political, that an individual resolves on authentic selfhood.  This resolve occurs only 
through the appropriated obligation of an individual being at the same time “apolis:” 
Preeminent in the historical place…[one becomes] at the same time apolis, without city and place, 
lonely, strange, and alien, without issue amid the essent as a whole, at the same time without statute 
and limit, without structure and order, because…[along with other Dasein, one and other Dasein] as 
creators must first create all this.50  
One becomes apolis precisely because one’s resolute choice transcends the present in favor 
of one’s potentiality that appeals to one from out of the future.  In this sense, it is more 
authentic to be willingly apolis than to be polis if the latter entails surrender to the appeal of 
das Man and adherence to the collective identity that installs a loss of authenticity. 
One who (through the projection of authentic possibilities of being) discloses his or 
her historical place sustains the tension of being polis/apolis in possibility. This is a kind of 
knowing, not as Platonic epistemē, but rather as Aristotelian phronēsis, recognizing that there 
is no final determination of any individual’s possibilities of being up until death as the one 
possibility that outstrips all others.  Hence, all political structures and orders, all statutes and 
limitations (civil or otherwise), are subject to the irruptive and open disclosure of authentic 
selfhood despite the individual’s immersion in the “public” ordering of the life-world and its 
concerns (Besorgnisse).  Those individuals who resolve on authentic selfhood do so first and 
foremost “to become pre-eminent in historical being as creators, as men of action.” 
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This means a commitment to the fundamental obligation to one’s own being, to be a 
site of ongoing and indeterminate unconcealment of the fullness of one’s being, to win the 
authentic future from the inauthentic future.  This is an obligation that eschews surrender to 
dogma to the extent that this dogma is to be found in the “publicness” (Öffentlichkeit) of das 
Man, in what is stipulated thereby as both statute and limitation, both structure and order, 
both deed and misdeed.  Swazo clarified this point in the context of the political thus: 
The pre-eminence in action as authentic doing is resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), and as resoluteness 
for individuation it is essentially political rather than a-political.  Just as “resoluteness” is the name 
Heidegger gives to authentic existence, so the individual Dasein’s political resoluteness is what grants 
the further possibility of an authentic politics correspondent to that authentic existence.  This authentic 
politics, granted by an individual’s resoluteness, takes its form by way of that authentically ek-sistent 
being-with-one another determined by resoluteness.51 
Fred Dallmayr adds clarity to the point: 
In Being and Time…resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] is linked intimately with the notion of “openness” 
(Erschlossenheit), that is, with Dasein’s availability for its own essence or ontological ground.  This 
openness is manifest primarily in the call of “conscience” that as the “call of care” summons Dasein 
into the realm of its ownmost potential…[i.e., a call to] “self-projection toward proper 
accountability…”52 
One who heeds the call of conscience resolves upon a self-projection that sustains his/her 
ontological obligation.  This obligation then grounds autonomy in the modern philosophical 
sense of positive or negative freedom. Self-projection toward proper accountability therefore 
means that individuals resolving on authentic selfhood seek ever and again to gain access to 
the origin of freedom, to the ontological ground of their being as they transcend (ek-stasis) 
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the limitations of the present.  Once this origin is accessed as the ground of freedom, the 
calculative thinking that installs a dogmatic attitude loses its governing power over an 
individual.  An individual having a true recognition of the call of conscience does not “expect 
to be told something currently useful about assured possibilities of ‘taking action’ which are 
available and calculable.” 53  Heidegger clarifies: 
The call of conscience fails to give any such ‘practical’ injunctions, solely because it summons Dasein 
to existence, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self.  With the maxims which one might be led 
to expect—maxims which could be reckoned up unequivocally—the conscience would deny to 
existence nothing less than the very possibility of taking action.54 
But, (following Dreyfus) it is not a priori maxims that guide the individual but, instead, the 
practical wisdom that one such as a phronimos is able to determine in the given situation of 
deliberated decision.   By contrast, one who finds his or her abode in dogma—whether in 
terms of the appeal of historicism, actualism, acquiescence in the presumed authority of 
tradition, or in the sundry appeals of this or that political or religious ideology—betrays the 
call to proper accountability. The latter is that fundamental liability that ever pits the 
possibilities of one’s authentic being against those of inauthentic being, the latter ‘secured’ in 
and for dogma. 
Settling the Question at Issue 
 The central question at issue may now be settled with a determinate answer on the 
basis of the foregoing clarification of Heidegger’s thought.  At the outset the question was: 
How can one be authentic except with reference to some dogma?  Some comments about 
‘dogma’ are now in order. 
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‘Dogma’ can be understood in several ways.  Its plurivocity requires us to answer 
such that this plurivocity remains explicitly interrogated.  The word is usually associated with 
“doctrine,” “creed,” “canon,” “system of belief,” and so on—all of which have meanings 
with referential contexts of signification explicitly or tacitly philosophical, religious, and/or 
political.  Each concept has the problematic character of pronouncing and providing what is 
accounted a final determination of a matter that has been contested.  Usually, this is a 
determination that has, at minimum, a logical internal coherence and, more likely, a degree of 
presumed correspondence to a given historical setting of praxis.  What is doctrinal, credal, 
canonical, or systemically ordering of belief governs human action, e.g., in stipulating or 
promulgating a given historical relation of a communally sanctioned “orthodoxy” with its 
correlative “orthopraxis.”  One having “correct belief” or opinion in such a setting is then 
said to have “correct action” when individual action is manifestly consistent with that belief 
or opinion.  Thus: 
• In the Greek philosophical tradition, orthodoxy may or may not be found 
equivalent to infallible truth, such as Plato represented by way of knowledge 
of the Forms, even as it may be found assumed to be authoritative in the 
Athenian ancestral custom that Socrates challenged. 
• In the tradition of the Roman Christian Church, i.e., for Catholic patristic 
tradition, orthodoxy may or may not be found equivalent to infallible truth, 
dependent on the specific appeal to authority, e.g., appeal to the teaching 
authority of the Magisterium and the Holy Office in Rome or the ex cathedra 
pronouncements of the Pope as Vicar of Christ on earth, thus as one having 
both spiritual and temporal authority. 
• The same holds for other appeals to religious authority, e.g., to rabbinic 
tradition and halakha (oral law) in the case of ‘orthodox’ rabbinic Judaism or 
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to various schools of Islamic jurisprudence, thus to sharī‘a (as Islamic law) 
and authentic ahadith (sunnah, i.e., traditions of the sayings and practices of 
the prophet Mohammed) in the case of both Sunnī and Shī’a Islam. 
• In the Western philosophical tradition, orthodoxy is meaningful in the context 
of a fundamental metaphysical position that governs for a time, issuing the 
standards of thought, word, and deed for an age/epoch, each of which may 
then be ascribed the status of infallibility by those who adhere to the authority 
of such tradition. 
In each of these cases, however, Heidegger’s phenomenological clarification of 
authenticity and the ontological obligation of authentic selfhood clarifies that authenticity and 
dogma cannot be inextricably linked such as presupposed in the question at issue.  On the 
contrary, the call of conscience that is essential to self-discovery and authentic selfhood 
makes one’s commitment to a given political association wholly historically contingent and 
time-limited. This fact, therefore, demands a perpetual fundamental interrogation with 
reference to one’s futural potentiality.  One can be authentic without reference to dogma, 
precisely because authenticity is ever a call to challenge the supposed authority of dogma as a 
challenge to the governance of the past and the present over the claim of the future.  This is 
consistent with an individual’s obligation to project upon his or her own most proper 
possibilities of authentic being, consistent thereby with ek-sistent humanity’s being-futural, 
in contrast to an individual’s selfhood wrongly interpreted as an entity that is merely present-
at-hand.  In heeding the call to win the authentic future against the inauthentic future, an 
individual finds him/herself immersed in a contest to overcome the dominance of the 
everyday and, thereby, to transmute the power of being so as to disclose the future in the 
fullness of its openness and not merely according to some fated destiny or determination 
governed by inherited tradition. 
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In this sense, therefore, the manifold ways of human being transmute extant structures 
and orders, extant statutes and limitations, engendering the site of history, creating the polis 
(the political as topos of being) anew.  The dogma that belongs to metaphysics, philosophy, 
politics, religion, etc., gives way to renovation: All dogmas are overcome as a matter of 
praxis, in what Bernard P. Dauenhauer calls “the renovation of the political,”55 thus as the 
authentic doing of authentic Dasein.  Individuated Dasein heeds the summons of the 
conscience, on that basis resolving to ek-sist in the possibility disclosed while keeping open 
all other possibilities and foreclosing the demands of the anonymous das Man. 
It may be said that there is something “uncanny” in this resolve.  Heidegger 
recognized this: “The discourse of the conscience,” asserts, “never comes to utterance.”56  In 
the individual’s resoluteness a reticent projection upon one’s potentiality for being 
disengages from the dominion of das Man: “authentic disclosedness modifies with equal 
primordiality both the way the ‘world’ is discovered (and this is founded upon that 
disclosedness) and the way in which the Dasein-with of Others is disclosed.” 57   The 
individual thus disengages from mere concern with all that is present-at-hand and 
appropriates possibilities in the mode of solicitude that ‘leaps forth and liberates.’  However, 
Heidegger cautions: “One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness 
if one should want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have 
been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them.”58  Indeed, the “situation” of 
resoluteness is such that it “cannot be calculated in advance or presented like something 
present-at-hand which is waiting for someone to grasp it.  It merely gets disclosed in a free 
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resolving which has not been determined beforehand but is open to the possibility of such 
determination.”  That, of course, is consistent with the disposition of one capable of phronetic 
decision. 
The individual Dasein, attesting to the disclosure of his or her topos, in and for “the 
polis” as the site of history, “maintains itself both in truth and in untruth with equal 
primordiality.”  Resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] and irresoluteness [Unentschlossenheit] 
therefore remain always in tension: 
The term “irresoluteness” merely expresses that phenomenon which we have interpreted as a Being-
surrendered to the way in which things have been prevalently interpreted by the “they.”  Dasein, as a 
they-self, gets “lived” by the common-sense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves 
upon anything but which has always made its decision.  “Resoluteness” signifies letting oneself be 
summoned out of one’s lostness in the “they.”  The irresoluteness of the “they” remains dominant 
notwithstanding, but it cannot impugn resolute existence.59  
The “reticence” that belongs to resoluteness and the commitment an individual makes to his 
or her authentic selfhood contrast sharply with the “publicness” that belongs to dogma:  (1) 
An individual’s attestation of his or her authentic Self overcomes and disabuses the 
inauthentic self of the anonymous rule of das Man; further, (2) the authentic future is won 
over the inauthentic future as individuated Dasein resolutely attests to its most fundamental 
obligation (ontological liability) of disclosing the world anew.  One concludes, therefore, on 
the basis of the foregoing clarification grounded in Heidegger’s phenomenological insights, 
that one can be—indeed, one must be—authentic without reference to dogma. 
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